Legal vacuum: Threat of space terrorism is no longer science fiction

As satellite technology accelerates and space becomes increasingly accessible to private and state actors alike, an unsettling new threat looms above Earth’s atmosphere: space terrorism.

Once the domain of science fiction, the idea of terrorist activity in outer space is now a growing concern among experts. The democratisation of space has opened doors not only to innovation but also to vulnerability, and current legal frameworks may not be equipped to respond.

Over the past decade, the rise of commercial space ventures and falling satellite development costs have dramatically lowered the barriers to becoming “spacefaring”. This shift has empowered governments, private corporations and, more alarmingly, non-state actors. Groups once considered irrelevant to space security are now capable of disrupting orbital systems through cyber attacks on satellites and ground stations.

In March 2022, Network Battalion (NB65), a group linked to Anonymous, allegedly hacked Russia’s civilian space agency Roscosmos in protest of the invasion of Ukraine. The group claimed control over several satellites, prompting Roscosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin to warn that disabling another nation’s satellites could constitute a “casus belli” – a cause for war.

Although the incident caused little lasting damage, it underscored a broader shift: non-state actors increasingly possess the capability to interfere with space infrastructure. It also raises urgent questions about accountability, jurisdiction and the adequacy of international law.

International space law, anchored in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, was drafted at a time when only a few states had access to orbit. The treaty emphasises peaceful exploration and cooperation, stating that activities in space must align with the UN Charter. Yet it contains no explicit provisions addressing terrorism or the actions of non-state entities.

Article VI holds states responsible for national activities in space, whether by government agencies or private firms. However, it does not define “non-governmental entities” nor outline enforcement mechanisms. As private companies assume roles once reserved for national agencies, this ambiguity leaves a critical gap.

The Liability Convention of 1972 provides recourse for damage caused by space objects but focuses primarily on state actors and does not address ideologically driven attacks by rogue groups or individuals.

Compounding the issue is the absence of a coherent definition of space terrorism. Traditional definitions emphasise coercion of states through violence, but how does this apply when the target is a satellite orbiting Earth? Some experts propose defining space terrorism as ideologically motivated destruction targeting the space industry, capturing economic dimensions but overlooking national security implications. Without clarity, acts ranging from cyber intrusions to jamming risk being misclassified or ignored.

Space terrorism is not entirely new. In 1999, the UK’s Skynet military satellite was reportedly hacked by attackers demanding ransom. More recently, Russia has been accused of persistently jamming UK satellites, disrupting communications vital to civilian and military operations.

As space systems become tightly integrated with Earth-based infrastructure — from telecommunications to navigation — the stakes grow exponentially. Experts warn the next decade may see a surge in ideologically motivated satellite attacks, with severe consequences for global security and commerce.

UNOOSA has begun to address these threats, but without a dedicated legal framework, efforts remain fragmented. Space terrorism is no longer theoretical. The question is no longer whether it will occur, but how the international community will respond. Without clear rules and cooperation, humanity risks turning the final frontier into the next battlefield.

The Conversation